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http://www.biomedcentral.com/1746-6148/10/145RESEARCH ARTICLE Open AccessModular framework to assess the risk of African
swine fever virus entry into the European Union
Lina Mur1*, Beatriz Martínez-López1,4, Solenne Costard2,6, Ana de la Torre3, Bryony A Jones2, Marta Martínez1,
Fernando Sánchez-Vizcaíno1, María Jesús Muñoz3, Dirk U Pfeiffer2, José Manuel Sánchez-Vizcaíno1
and Barbara Wieland2,5Abstract
Background: The recent occurrence and spread of African swine fever (ASF) in Eastern Europe is perceived as
a serious risk for the pig industry in the European Union (EU). In order to estimate the potential risk of ASF virus
(ASFV) entering the EU, several pathways of introduction were previously assessed separately. The present work
aimed to integrate five of these assessments (legal imports of pigs, legal imports of products, illegal imports of
products, fomites associated with transport and wild boar movements) into a modular tool that facilitates the
visualization and comprehension of the relative risk of ASFV introduction into the EU by each analyzed pathway.
Results: The framework’s results indicate that 48% of EU countries are at relatively high risk (risk score 4 or 5 out
of 5) for ASFV entry for at least one analyzed pathway. Four of these countries obtained the maximum risk score
for one pathway: Bulgaria for legally imported products during the high risk period (HRP); Finland for wild boar;
Slovenia and Sweden for legally imported pigs during the HRP. Distribution of risk considerably differed from one
pathway to another; for some pathways, the risk was concentrated in a few countries (e.g., transport fomites),
whereas other pathways incurred a high risk for 4 or 5 countries (legal pigs, illegal imports and wild boar).
Conclusions: The modular framework, developed to estimate the risk of ASFV entry into the EU, is available in a
public domain, and is a transparent, easy-to-interpret tool that can be updated and adapted if required. The model’s
results determine the EU countries at higher risk for each ASFV introduction route, and provide a useful basis to
develop a global coordinated program to improve ASFV prevention in the EU.
Keywords: African swine fever, Emerging disease, Introduction, European Union, Pigs, Risk assessment,
Semi-quantitative framework, Transboundary diseaseBackground
The European Union (EU) has an ever-increasingly highly
industrialized and specialized pig production sector [1],
and is the second largest pig producer in the world with
22.6 million tons of pork produced in 2012 [2]. To main-
tain this high level of production and the current swine
health status, it is crucial to prevent the introduction and
re-introduction of infectious diseases, particularly OIE
notifiable diseases such as African swine fever (ASF). The
introduction of ASF into any EU country would result in
an immediate export ban of pigs and pig products from* Correspondence: linamur@ucm.es
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unless otherwise stated.the infected area. This could cause huge losses for the
affected country, especially given the ban of intra-EU
movements as it poses the highest volume of trade, but
also to the EU as a whole. The EU is a net exporter of
pork, with 2.3 million tons of pork exported to third
countries in 2012. Furthermore, there is the potential
to increase exports due to high demand from Russia
and China [2], besides important intra-EU trade.
ASF is one of the most devastating swine diseases given
its high mortality, economic losses as a result of trade
restrictions, and the fact that no vaccine is available for its
control [3]. Traditionally, this viral infectious disease has
been widespread on the African continent, where it still
remains in many countries. In 1960, ASF spread to some
southern European countries (Portugal and Spain), where. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly credited. The Creative Commons Public Domain
g/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this article,
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Sardinia (Italy), ASF has been endemic since 1978, which
is the cause of much concern, although it has not spread
to other EU areas [5]. In other European countries and
some territories of the American continent (e.g., Brazil [6],
the Dominican Republic, Haiti and Cuba [7]), ASF virus
(ASFV) was also introduced in the 20th century, but was
swiftly eradicated by drastic control programs.
Since its introduction into Georgia in 2007 [8], ASFV
has spread to Russia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and later to the
Ukraine and Belarus, and has affected both domestic pig
and wild boar (Sus scrofa L.) populations. More recently, in
January and February 2014, ASF was confirmed in dead
wild boars in Lithuania and Poland [9]. This situation is
perceived to be a major threat for European pig producers
and has increased disease awareness among Eastern EU
member states [10,11].
Since there is no vaccine available for ASFV, disease
prevention and rapid control require safe disposal of waste
from international ports and airports, effective surveillance,
disease awareness in high-risk areas, and regularly updated
control and contingency plans. The design of tailored pre-
vention and control strategies benefits from knowledge of
the identification and allocation of the risks for ASFV intro-
duction, which can be generated transparently through risk
assessment [12].
Various EU countries have already made country-specific
risk assessments. Finland has analyzed the potential routes
of ASFV introduction by emphasizing the risk of wild
boar infection in the country, as well as the importance
of biosecurity measures to prevent domestic pigs coming
into contact with ASFV [13]. Germany has analyzed the
risk associated with returning animal transport vehicles,
which it has classified as moderate for the transport of
breeding pigs, but as high for movements of pigs for
fattening and slaughter [14]. Other analyses have been
carried out to estimate the risk of ASFV introduction
into the United Kingdom [15], Poland [16] and Denmark
[17]. However, none has been published in the peer-
reviewed scientific literature. Consequently, the results are
available only upon request to the authors.
The risk of ASFV entry into the EU has been analyzed
by the authors of the present study for five different
pathways, these being: i) legal imports of live pigs during
the high-risk period (HRP; i.e. before detecting the first
case in the exporting country) [18]; ii) legal imports of
different types of pig products also during the HRP [19];
iii) illegal imports of pig products [20]; iv) transport
fomites (including contaminated trucks or waste from
international planes and ships) [21]; and v) wild boar
movements [22]. The objective of the present work was to
integrate all these pathways into a flexible and transparent
modular framework to enable the visualization and com-
prehension of the risk of ASFV introduction into EU bythese five different pathways. The results of this frame-
work will identify the EU countries at higher risk for all
the analyzed pathways, in which specific control strategies
can be adopted to prevent ASFV entry into the EU. In
addition, the provided structure can be later used as an
example to assess the risk of ASF entrance into other
regions or can be conveniently adapted for the intro-
duction of other diseases.
Methods
Model structure
A modular risk assessment framework was developed to
separately integrate the risk assessments for the five main
routes of entry (Figure 1) in order to provide an overview
of the risk of ASF introduction into the EU. Five modules
were developed to estimate the risk of ASFV entry into 27
of the 28 EU countriesa via each analyzed pathway: legal
imports of live pigs, legal imports of pig products, illegal
imports of pig products, transport-associated fomites,
and wild boar movements. The risk pathways included
in the analysis were based on a literature review that
considers ASFV transmission mechanisms, known routes
of introduction into previously free areas, and the current
epidemiological situation.
All five modules, and consequently the modular frame-
work that integrates them, correspond to the entry as-
sessment component as defined in the OIE risk analysis
framework, where entry addresses the likelihood of a
commodity infected by a certain pathogen (hazard) being
released into a particular territory [12]. The exposure and
consequence assessments, which have been previously
published [23], were not included.
Description of pathway modules
Different approaches were taken to develop the five risk
assessment modules after considering pathway-specific
characteristics and data availability. The risk of entry via
legal import pathways was estimated by quantitative
models, whereas risk was assessed by semi-quantitative
models for illegal imports, wild boar and transport-
associated fomites.
The legal import (live pigs and pig products) risk as-
sessments provided risk estimates as probability distri-
butions for ASFV introduction. In order to facilitate the
visualization and interpretation of these results, the mean
probabilities of ASFV introduction were categorized into
six risk scores (risk scores from 0 to 5) based on natural
breaks calculated by Jenks algorithm [24]. All the semi-
quantitative models followed a similar approach using
proxy indicators (parameters related to the level of risk
and for which enough data are available). The data values
for each proxy indicator were categorized using natural
breaks (by Jenks algorithm for transport-associated fomi-
tes and wild boar, and manual natural breaks for the illegal
Figure 1 Detailed structure of the modular framework. The five risk pathway modules are represented and include the main steps of the respective
quantitative and semi-quantitative models. P (Probability in the quantitative assessments, Proxy in the semi-quantitative assessments), RV (Risk Value), JENKS
NB (Jenks Natural Breaks), WLC (Weighted linear combination of values), Manual NB (Manual Natural Breaks), X (Multiplication of values) + (sum of values).
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(scores from 0 to 5). Each module produced an overall
risk score for all the EU member states, calculated by a
weighted linear combination of the scores of the proxy
indicators. The weights of each parameter were obtained by
expert opinion elicitation. The use of such methodology
produces risk scores from 0 to 5 that reflect probabilities of
0 = negligible, 1 = very low, 2 = low, 3 =medium, 4 = high
and 5 = very high to compare the remaining countries
within the same pathway.
The detailed structure, parameters, inputs and outputs
for these modules are available in separate publications
[18-22]. The present work provides only a brief summary
of each module in order to facilitate the comprehension
of the adjustments made and, consequently, the proper
interpretation of the results obtained.
Module 1 and 2: Legal imports.
For both legal import pathways (i.e., live pigs and pig
products), two quantitative risk assessments [18,19] wereconducted as detailed data were available for not only
the frequencies and amounts of imports of pigs and
products from extra-EU countries (considered to be
countries of origin, or “country o”) to EU member states
(countries of destination “d”), but also for the numbers
of pigs and pork production quantities in the countries
of origin [25]. For both modules, a similar structure based
on a scenario tree was used (Figure 2). For pig products,
three different types of pork products, referred to as fresh
meat (referred to as “a”), frozen meat (referred to as “b”)
and processed products (salted, smoked or fat products)
(referred to as “c”), were considered to account for the dif-
ferent ASFV survival periods for these products [19]. The
models were developed in @ Risk version 5.5 (Palisade
Corporation, Newfield, NY, USA).
Module 3: Illegal imports of pig products
As data on illegal imports are very scarce and the prob-
abilities associated with most steps of the risk pathway
would be difficult to estimate quantitatively, a different
Figure 2 Scenario tree for the legal import of pigs and legal imports of products pathways.
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for personal consumption and for commercial purposes
was modeled semi-quantitatively using ten social, economic
and geographical factors, also called proxy indicators, which
were assumed to influence the risk of illegal import (more
information is available in Table 1). Further details on the
illegal import model and its results are available in [20].
Module 4: transport fomites
Similarly to the model for illegal imports, a proxy-based
semi-quantitative model was used to estimate the risk
of introduction through fomites associated with trans-
port vehicles. The three routes that considered transport-
associated fomites were: trucks returning from ASF-affected
areas, waste from different ship types, and waste from inter-
national planes [21].
Module 5: wild boar movement
The risk of ASFV introduction through wild boar (Sus
scrofa L.) movements was estimated for those EU countries
sharing borders with non EU countries from Eastern
Europe, considered to be the origin of the risk. For this
purpose, a semi-quantitative model was employed that
considered two sources of infection: wild boar infection in
the country of origin through contact with ASF-infected
wildlife (wild, feral or captive) or through contact with
ASF-infected domestic pigs. Afterward, the introduction
of ASFV into the EU was assumed to occur through
the natural movement of infected wild boars or through
contacts of infected wild boars with other wild boars.
The detailed structure and parameters considered in
the model are described in Table 1 and elsewhere [22].
Overall risk of entry
The modular framework was implemented in Microsoft
Excel (Microsoft Office 2010 Professional Edition) and is
available as an additional file (Additional file 1). All the
modules summarized in Section “Description of pathway
modules” were included with a first worksheet that doc-
umented the methodology, module structure, assump-
tions and limitations, and a second worksheet with all the
data inputs and calculations employed. A summary table
with all the information (definitions and data sources) of all
the parameters used in the framework is presented in
Table 1. Additionally, the final risk scores of each country
by all analyzed pathways were summarized in Table 2.
Sensitivity analysis
For each module, sensitivity analyses were previously
conducted to assess the robustness of the model and the
influence of the different input parameters and/or the
weights assigned to the proxies on the model results
[18-22]. For the modular framework, the influence of
the method used in each module to categorize the dataof the proxies and risk scores was also assessed. In the
individual risk assessments, categorization into risk scores
was based on the natural breaks calculated with Jenks
algorithm [24], except for the illegal pathway module. In
the illegal pathway module, the parameter values tended
to be clustered at lower values with a few extreme high
values. Thus, Jenks algorithm led to quite low values
which fell into relatively high risk scores. Therefore, a
manual definition of the natural categories was preferred.
In the sensitivity analysis, other commonly used cat-
egorizing methods, specifically quantiles and geometric
intervals, and Jenks algorithm for the illegal pathway,
were used to calculate the risk scores for all five pathways.
The results obtained with these alternative categorization
methods were compared with the original method. Specif-
ically, the list of countries at higher risk (a risk score equal
to 4 and/or 5) for each pathway when using the different
categorization methods is presented in descending order
(from highest to lowest) in Table 3. Variations in the
prioritization order, and the number of countries at higher
risk, are also included in this table.
A sensitivity index was also calculated to assess the
magnitude of the influence of the categorization methods
on each module results. This sensitivity index (SI) was
computed after considering the number of countries for
which the risk score changed “CC”, the extent of this
change “EC” (e.g., from 2 to 5, three levels of change), and
the total chances of change for this pathway “TC”. This
TC represents the sum of the potential levels of change
for all the countries by this pathway (e.g., a country with
an initial risk score of 3 has a maximum of three possible
levels of change, from 3 to 0, whereas a country with a risk
score of 1 has up to four possible levels of change). The
sum of the possibilities for all the countries composed the
TC for this pathway. The SI was computed as follows:
SI ¼
X
LC  CC
TC
Results
The model and its results are available as an Excel file in
a public domain (www. asfrisk.eu) and as Additional file 1.
The risk scores of ASFV introduction by the five pathways
into each EU member state are presented in the results
column on each pathway spreadsheet, and are also sum-
marized in Table 2 and in the “overall results summary”
worksheet of Additional file 1.
The list of countries at higher risk (risk scores equal to
4 or 5) per pathway is provided in Table 2 in descending
order, from highest to lowest risk (the natural breaks
row). These are the countries that would benefit from
prevention activities for each analyzed pathway. The
average number of countries with high-risk scores per
pathway was 3.6, and there were some pathways with
only two countries at higher risk (transport fomites),
Table 1 Parameters and sources of data employed in the modular framework for the ASF risk assessment
Pathway Parameter Definition Source
L.PIGS &L.PROD Po Probability of infection in the country of origin (country o) Beta(α1, α2)
α1 = X + 1; α2 = M-(X + 1)
X:number of outbreaks by month[26]
M: number of months considered
Ou Number of undetected outbreaks before official notification
in country o
[9]
To Average herd size in country o To = No/So
No Pig population in country o [9,27]
So Pig establishments in country o [27,28]
Hp Intra-herd prevalence [29,30]
Ps Probability of an ASF-infected pig surviving infection [31]
L.PIGS P1s Probability of selecting an ASF-infected pig from country o in month m Beta (α1, α2) α1 = NI + 1; α2 = No-(NI + 1)
NI = Po x Ou x To x Hp;
Pt Probability of survival during transportation [32]
P2S Probability of a pig surviving P2S = Ps*Pt
Snodm Imports of live swine (number of pigs) from country of origin (o)
to the EU destination country (d) in month m (in the last 5 years).
In order to transform Eurostat imports data (in 100 kg) into number
of pigs, a standard weight of 100 kg was assumed per pig.
[25]
Normal (μ, σ)
Spodm Probability of an ASF infected animal from country o entering
country d in month (m)
Binomial (n, p)
n = Snodm
p = P1S x P2S
PfS Probability of having at least one introduction of ASFV into one
EU country (d) from one of country of origin (o) in month m by
legal imports of live pigs
Pfs ¼ 1−
Y
odm
1−spodmð Þ
Pm Probability of a pig being grown for meat production Normal(Mo/No)
L. PRODS Mo Number of slaughtered pigs in countries o [27] (2005/2009)
PC kg of meat obtained per slaughtered pig (per 100 kg) [27] (2000-2009)
Co Annual pig meat production per country (100 kg) [27] (2005-2008)
P1P Probability of selecting infected ASFV pig meat from country
o in month m
P1p: Mi / (Co/12),
Mi: Po*Ou*To*Hp*Ps*Pm*PC
P2P Probability of meat belonging to one of the different types of
products considered
[25] (2008-2009)
P3P Probability of ASF virus survival in each meat product type
during transport.
[33,34]
pnodm Imports of each pig meat product type (100 kg weight)
from country “o” to EU country “d” in month “m”
[25] (2005-2009)
Ppodm Probabilities of ASF infected pig products of different types
(a-c) from country o entering country d in month m
Binomial (n, p)
n = pnodm
p = P1p* P2p * P3p
Pfp Probabilities of having at least one introduction of ASFV into
one EU country (d) from one country (o) in month m by
legal imports of each pig products type (a-c).
Pfp ¼ 1−
Y
odm
1−Ppodmð Þ
PTP Probabilities of having at least one introduction of ASFV into
one EU country (d) from one country o in month m by legal
imports of any pig product type.
PTp ¼ 1−
Yc
i¼a
1−Pf p
 
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Table 1 Parameters and sources of data employed in the modular framework for the ASF risk assessment (Continued)
ILLEGAL P1I Probability of release through illegal importation for personal consumption Sum of weighted risk scores for P3, P4 and P5
P3I Outbound tourism to ASF-affected countries. Holiday or business
trips of 1 night or more from EC27 to Africa and Russia, arrivals
of non resident visitors at national borders of Georgia
[25], Georgian National Tourism Agency
P4I Inbound tourism from ASF-affected countries: Arrivals to EU27
of non residents from Africa and Russia staying in hotels, etc.
[25]
P5 I Residents (citizens )from ASF-affected countries [25]
P2 I Probability of release through illegal importation for commercial purposes Sum of weighted risk scores for P5, P6 and P7
P6I Price of pork. 2010 annual average price of Grade E carcasses
(55-59% lean meat percentage) in euros per 100 kg
European community
P7I Geographic position Sum of weighted risk scores (P8,P9,P10)
P8I Number of ports and airports World Port Index 2009; [25]
P9I Distance in km to nearest ASF-affected country (from country
border to border of nearest ASF-affected country)
Shapefile of national boundaries
P10I Number of international terrestrial border points with non
EU member states
FAO Geonetwork: shapefiles of railways,
roads and waterways of the World VMAP)
TAF P1t Number of potential ASF-contaminated returning trucks. Number
of live pigs exported from EU to ASF-affected countries by road
[25] (Nov. 2007-2009)- (ComExt)
P2t Number of ways (and consequently, facility) of a truck to arrive
by road in an EU country from non EU countries. Number of
roads crossing EU national boundaries with non EU states
FAO Geonetwork. Roads of the World
P3t Probability of returning trucks not being properly disinfected [35]
P4t Potential ASF-contaminated waste introduced by cargo ships. Inward
number of cargo ships from ASF-infected countries to EU ports
[25]-Traditional international trade database
access (ComExt); [9]
P5t Potential ASF-contaminated waste introduced by passenger
ships (excluding cruises). Inward number of passenger ships
from ASF-infected countries to the EU
[25]-Traditional international trade database
access (ComExt); [9]
P6t Potential ASF-contaminated waste introduced by Short sea shipping
(SSS) movements. Ships from ASF-infected countries to the EU
[25]-Traditional international trade database
access (ComExt); GIS
P7t Potential ASF-contaminated waste introduced by cruises.
Proportion of cruise ships from ASF-affected areas per country
P7t ¼ CAiCp=p½ 
CA Number of cruise ships arriving at EU ports after one stop in
ASF-infected areas
Travelocity. http://travel.travelocity.com
Cp Number of cruise passengers arriving at EU ports (Cp) [25] (ComExt)
p Average number of passengers per cruise ship Truecruises. http://www.truecruise.com/
cruise-ship-database.aspx
P8t Potential contaminated waste introduced by international
passenger flights. Commercial passenger flights from
ASF-infected countries to EU airports
[25,9]
WB P1W Probability of wild boar becoming infected in country o
through contact with infected wild boar
P1w = P4w*P5 w
P2W Probability of wild boar becoming infected in country o
through contact with infected domestic pigs
P2 w = P6 w *P7 w
P3W Probability of infected wild boar crossing national border P3a w: P8 w *P9 w P3b w: P9 w *P10 w
P4W Wild boar outbreak density in countries o [9] 2007-2012
P5W Wild boar population density in countries o [36-38]
P6W Density of domestic pig outbreaks in countries o [9] 2007-2012
P7W Domestic pig population density in countries o [36]
P8W Surface of shared wild boar suitable habitat along national borders Corine land cover
P9W Distance from EU countries to the nearest outbreak (wild boar) [9] 2007-2012
P10W Distance from EU countries to the nearest outbreak (domestic pig) [9] 2007-2012
L.PIGS (Legal imports of pigs), L.PROD (Legal imports of products), ILLEGAL (Illegal imports), TAF (Transport associated fomites) and WB (wild boar).
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Table 2 Risk scores of the five modules for the 27 EU
state members
Country Legal
pigs
Legal
products
Illegal Transport Wild
boar
Austria 0 0 2 1 NS
Belgium 1 0 1 2 NS
Bulgaria 0 5 2 2 2
Cyprus 0 0 2 1 NS
Czech Republic 0 0 2 1 NS
Denmark 1 1 1 2 NS
Estonia 2 0 2 3 3
Finland 4 0 2 3 5
France 4 3 4 2 NS
Germany 3 4 4 3 NS
Greece 4 0 2 2 1
Hungary 0 0 1 2 2
Ireland 2 2 1 1 NS
Italy 0 2 4 2 NS
Latvia 0 0 2 2 4
Lithuania 0 0 2 4 3
Luxembourg 0 0 1 1 NS
Malta 0 0 1 1 NS
Netherlands 0 1 2 2 NS
Poland 3 1 2 4 4
Portugal 0 0 2 2 NS
Romania 0 4 2 2 4
Slovakia 0 0 1 2 2
Slovenia 5 0 1 2 NS
Spain 0 1 3 2 NS
Sweden 5 0 2 2 NS
United Kingdom 3 3 4 2 NS
(NS: not studied). Risk scores equal or higher than 4 were highlighted using
boldface numbers.
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wild boar) countries at higher risk.
Different distributions of risk scores were observed
between pathways (Figure 3). Whereas most countries
presented a risk score of 0 (legal pathways) in some
analyzed pathways, the majority of countries presented
a risk score of 2 in others (illegal imports and transport
fomites). Interestingly for these last two pathways, none
of the countries presented the highest risk score of 5.
Fifteen EU member states (55.5%) had at least one
risk pathway with a risk score equal to or higher than 3
(Figure 3). Thirteen countries (48%) presented one risk
score of 4 or 5. Four countries had a risk score of 5 for
one pathway: Bulgaria for legally imported products
during the HRP; Finland for wild boar, Slovenia and
Sweden for legally imported pigs during the HRP.However, these countries did not necessarily obtain high
risk scores in other pathways; indeed some (Bulgaria,
Slovenia and Sweden) obtained risk scores of 0 and 1 for
other pathways.
Among the 12 countries with lower risk scores (all risk
scores lower than 3), some countries presented similar
risk profiles, with the same risk scores for the same
pathways.
Sensitivity analysis
The results compiled in Table 3 reflect that for all the
pathways and categorization methods, only two pathways
presented differences in the order of countries at higher
risk. In the TAF pathway, Lithuania and Finland inter-
changed their positions from the second to the third,
and vice versa, when applying quantiles and geometric
intervals instead of Jenks NB. For the illegal pathway,
modifications in the order were observed when comparing
Manual NB (the reference method) with the other
categorization methods (Jenks NB, quantiles, geometric
interval). Italy became the first country at risk (instead
of forth by manual NB), and France came fifth (instead
of third by manual NB) when using other methods.
Consequently, the positions of the other countries
changed, but not their relative order. For the other
pathways, the only observed changes related to the in-
clusion of countries in category 5 (the countries consid-
ered at risk 4), or to those included in category 4.
The SIs calculated by the pathway and categorization
method are presented in Table 4. The pathway that
underwent the greatest modifications in terms of extent
of change (EC), unlike the others, is that associated with
legal import of products, which presented an average SI
over all categorization methods evaluated at 34. This
was also the only pathway for which some countries (8)
underwent the maximum EC at three levels. In the
remaining pathways, risk scores were less sensitive,
with an SI of 8 (Legal imports of pigs and Transport
pathways), 11 for the wild boar module and 12 for
Illegal transport. The maximum EC observed in the other
pathways was 2 levels, which affected four countries (legal
imports of pigs) and one country in the illegal pathway.
In the TAF and wild boar pathways, the countries’ risk
scores changed one level at the most.
Discussion
The modular framework herein presented integrates the
methodology and outputs from five pathway-specific risk
assessments to produce specific risk profiles for ASFV
routes of entry into the EU. All the modules used the
best data available, which need to be consistent and
homogenously collected across EU member states. Due
to the limited availability of detailed data and the huge
variability between EU member states in terms of pig
Table 3 Ordered list of country at highest risk per pathway using different categorization methods (NB: Jenks Natural
Breaks, Q: Quantiles, GI: Geometric Interval; MNB: Manual Natural Breaks; RS: Risk Score)
Pathway Categorization
method
Countries with
RS 5
Countries with
RS 4
Countries that underwent
changes in risk order
New countries
with RS 5
New countries
with RS 4
Legal pigs NB Sweden > Slovenia Finland > Greece > France
Q Sweden > Slovenia Finland > Greece >
France > Poland
0 0 1
GI Sweden > Slovenia Finland > Greece > France >
Poland > UK > Germany
0 0 4
Legal
products
NB Bulgaria Romania > Germany
Q Bulgaria > Romania >
Germany > UK > France
Ireland > Italy >
Netherlands > Spain
0 4 4
GI Bulgaria > Romania >
Germany > UK > France
Ireland > Italy > Netherlands >
Spain > Poland > Denmark
0 4 6
Illegal NB Italy > UK > Germany Spain > France 3
Q Italy > UK > Germany Spain > France > Greece 0 3 1
GI Italy > UK > Germany Spain > France > Greece >
Finland > Sweden
0 3 3
MNB - UK > Germany > France > Italy 2 −3 −1
TAF NB - Poland > Lithuania
Q - Poland > Finland > Lithuania 1 0 1
GI - Poland > Finland > Lithuania 1 0 1
Wild boar NB Finland Romania > Latvia > Poland
Q Finland > Romania Latvia > Poland 0 1 −1
GI Finland > Romania Latvia 0 1 −2
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socio-cultural features, the results generated by this
modular risk assessment framework need to be inter-
preted with caution. Some of the EU databases used for
model parameterization were not as complete and detailed
as national ones [18]. It has to be stated that this may have
resulted in under- or overestimations of risk scores forFigure 3 Distribution of risk scores per pathway. The number of countsome countries, depending on the reliability of the data
available per country in these generic databases. Data
on wild boar density and abundance of backyard pig
production were limited at the time of the analysis per-
formance, and could definitely affect the model results
and the next assessment steps (backyard data could
especially affect the future exposure assessment) [21].ries per risk score was represented for the five assessed pathways.
Table 4 Sensitivity indices obtained in the sensitivity analysis of each pathway and categorization method
SI quantiles SI geometric Interval SI manual natural breaks Average SI per pathway Average EC Maximum EC (CC)
L. PIGS 10.9 4.2 NA 7.6 1.2 2(4)
L.PRODS 31.4 35.5 NA 33.5 2 3(8)
Illegal 9.5 13.7 12.6 11.6 1.1 2(1)
TAF 5.6 10.1 NA 7.9 1.0 1(9)
WB 5.6 16.7 NA 11.1 1.1 1(6)
SI (Sensitivity Index), EC (Extent of change), CC (Number of countries that suffered this change); L.PIGS (Legal imports of pigs), L.PROD (Legal imports of products),
ILLEGAL (Illegal imports of products), TAF (Transport associated fomites) and WB (wild boar); NA (Not applicable).
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and low biosecurity farm [39] or wild boar density models
based on ecological parameters [40] may improve the ana-
lysis. However, as the unit of analysis of this framework is
the national level, these data are not expected to influence
the final analysis outcome, especially when we consider
that the densities of wild boars or domestic pigs in the in-
dividual sensitivity analysis of the wild boar pathway were
the risk factor with the lowest influence on the model’s re-
sults [22].
The present framework integrates the calculations and
results of five risk analyses using diverse methodological
approaches for risk estimation. Legal import pathways
were estimated by using stochastic quantitative models;
consequently, an absolute probability of the risk of ASFV
entry was obtained per country (available in Additional
file 1). Only for this particular case can we state that
the risk of ASFV introduction through legal imports of
products during the HRP was higher than by legal imports
of pigs during the same period. The probability of ASFV
introduction through legal imports of pigs during the
HRP was extremely low (the maximum probability was
0.000393 estimated for Sweden which, on average, corre-
sponded to one introduction every 2544 years), while for
the legal imports of products during the HRP it was much
higher, with a maximum probability of 0.226 for Bulgaria
(one expected introduction 4.4 years on average). These
probabilities referred only to the risk of ASFV being
released into the EU by these routes, without considering
the probability of exposure, which could certainly modify
the final risk of ASF outbreak occurring in the country.
However, as the main goal of this work was to develop
a method to integrate different types of model (fitting
different data types and qualities) into the same framework,
the probabilistic results were transformed into risk scores
from 0 to 5, and took the same format as the other path-
ways. Nevertheless, both the detailed risk probabilities and
any additional information can easily be consulted in the
modular framework provided (see Additional file 1).
For the other pathways, estimated semi-quantitatively,
it was not possible to make comparisons between routes,
but between countries within the same route. The meth-
odology selected for the semi-quantitative assessmentsdiffered substantially from the conventional methods,
which combined matrices of numbers and risk terms. Risk
matrices can provide an impression of higher accuracy
and/or confidence if compared with qualitative assess-
ments, which can be particularly wrong when scores
are assigned and combined arbitrarily, and with no
transparency [41]. In contrast, the systematic approach
used herein produced risk scores by the weighted linear
combination of the selected parameters contributing to
the risk. The structure of these calculations, data inputs
and weights used in the framework are presented in
Additional file 1, thus ensuring the transparency of the
model methods and results.
Nonetheless, as with any risk assessment model, a certain
level of subjectivity was involved in selecting the pathways
analyzed (based on the literature review on the ASFV trans-
mission mechanisms, routes of introduction into previously
free areas and the current epidemiological situation), mod-
ule structure, methods applied, the parameters used as risk
indicators (based on data availability), and categorization
and weighting methods (analyzed in the sensitivity analysis).
Attempts were made to minimize these limitations by
means of the model’s transparency and the systematic
application of the chosen approaches, which occurred
with data categorization. After testing several categorization
methods, natural breaks were used as this is the method
that best adapts to the different distributions presented for
all the input data. Within this method, the optimization
method using Jenks algorithm was employed for most
pathways to minimize intra-class variance and to maximize
inter-class variances [24]. For the illegal import pathway
however, the very skewed distribution of some parameter
values led to relatively high-risk scores when Jenks adjust-
ment was utilized, and it was thus decided to use manual
natural breaks for this module. This observation is con-
firmed when comparing the list of countries at higher risk
by each categorization method within illegal pathway
(Table 2). The use of Manual NB provides a maximum risk
score of 4 for four countries, whereas with Jenks NB three
countries presented a risk score of 5. The lists of countries
at higher risk observed among the two NB categorization
methods were very similar, with two countries that modify
their order and consequently change the position of the
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the changes was not high (SI: 12.6) when comparing with
other pathways. Consequently, although the magnitude of
changes observed was not big, authors decided to employ
Manual NB for this pathway for calculating the final results,
as it better fits to the distribution of input data used and
provides more adjusted results.
The sensitivity analysis assessed the impact of the categ-
orization methods on the model’s outcomes and suggested
satisfactory model robustness for all the pathways, except
for the legal imports of products, which presented the
greatest EC, with an average SI of 34. In addition, a
maximum extent of change of 3 levels took place for
eight countries for the legal imports of products pathway
when modifying categorization. Within this pathway,
data categorization was used only for transforming risk
probabilities into risk scores, but conferred no additional
value to the calculations (see the model structure in Fig-
ure 1). Consequently for this specific case, evaluating the
absolute probabilistic values presented in Additional file 1
is recommended to better interpret the results instead
of risk scores.
For the remaining pathways, the variations found by
using other categorization methods were much slighter
(SI less than 12), with a maximum extent of 2 levels of risk
(legal imports of pigs during the HRP and illegal imports)
and 1 (transport fomites and wild boar). This confirms the
robustness of the model structure, especially for the semi-
quantitative pathways where data categorization proved
an important element to assess risk.
Besides the analysis of the EC observed (SI), the com-
parison of the main study output, specifically the list of
countries at highest risk per pathway, revealed good
consistency among the different categorization methods
employed. Indeed the order of countries at highest risk
changed only for the illegal pathway (when using manual
NB, as previously discussed) and for TAF (when quantiles
or geometric intervals were employed). Specifically for
TAF, the values of two countries interchanged from
second and third positions at risk, but both remained
in the same risk category. For all the other pathways,
no changes were observed in the list of the highest risk
countries, except for the inclusion of some countries at
the end of the list. These results suggest that the main
model’s outputs were not influenced when other categor-
izing methods were used.
All five modules within the framework provided relative
risk scores on a scale of risk scores from 0 to 5, the
equivalent to risk probabilities from negligible to very
high. Despite the use of different methodologies for
each pathway module inhibits a direct comparison of
the results among the pathways, as the same methodology
was used for all the countries within each module, it was
possible to compare the countries’ risk scores for a givenpathway. Accordingly, these results can be used at the EU
level to determine the countries/areas at higher risk per
route of introduction. The application of specific control
measures (adapted to the pathway’s origin of this risk) in
these high-risk countries/pathways could prove beneficial
for the whole EU. Based on this assumption, special atten-
tion should be paid to Sweden and Slovenia (risk of 5),
followed by Finland, France and Greece (4), for the legal
import of pigs pathway during the HRP. In relation with
legal imports of products during the HRP, the only coun-
try at high risk was Bulgaria (5), followed by Romania and
Germany (4). For illegal imports, no country presented
the highest score (5), but a risk score of 4 was estimated
for France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom.
Something similar occurred with the transport associated
fomites pathway, for which Lithuania and Poland obtained
the highest scores (4). Finally, the risk deriving from the
wild boar movement route was estimated with a score of
5 for Finland, followed by Latvia, Poland and Romania
with a risk score of 4.
Some countries, like Finland, Romania, Germany, Poland
and France, obtained risk scores of 4 and/or 5 for several
pathways. These countries would benefit from further
national research to elucidate which pathways are at
higher risk for their country and which actions can be
implemented to prevent these risks. Countries with similar
risk profiles are also often similar in terms of external
trade, geographic location, wild pig movements, and other
factors that have been considered in the assessment.
Germany and the UK obtained high risk scores for illegal
imports, legal import and transport, which reflect their
vast volume of trade with third countries [27]. They
operate more flights from ASF-affected countries, and
they also obtained the largest number of residents from
ASF-affected countries, and very high values for inbound
and outbound tourism (EUROSTAT data). In comparison
to other EU countries, these two countries maintain very
close relations with non EU countries, which could poten-
tially incur a risk for disease introduction.
Transport and wild boar obtained risk scores of 4 or 5
in Lithuania, Finland or Poland, which reflects their geo-
graphical proximity to affected areas and, consequently,
the facility of entrance by these routes influenced by
distance. These results have been recently validated by
the notification of ASF cases in dead wild boar in territories
of Lithuania and Poland [9]. Malta and Luxembourg, with
almost no pigs and an insignificant number of imports and
risk relations, were at extremely low risk (around 0) for all
the analyzed pathways.
In addition to these logical and biological arguments,
the results obtained in the present framework agree with
previous country-specific risk assessments. In a previous
risk assessment for Finland, introduction by wild boar
was considered to be the riskiest pathway [13], which
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module of the present framework. Similarly, Germany ob-
tained a risk score of 3 in the present transport fomites
module and a moderate-high risk for the risk of the means
of transport of pigs in the national assessment made by FLI
[14]. These examples stress that despite the framework’s
limitations, the obtained results agree with other assess-
ments. This, consequently, inspires confidence in our
model’s results. However, the authors are aware that these
agreements do not guarantee the exact prediction of risk.
The analysis of the present results per pathway also pro-
vides interesting information on risk management. In some
of the pathways analyzed, risk concentrated mainly in very
few countries (transport fomites in two countries), whereas
other pathways proved relevant for many countries (legal
imports of pigs, illegal imports and wild boar). These
findings suggest the benefits of a coordinated EU pro-
gram for preventing and controlling the disease.
The outcomes obtained with this modular framework
can be used to inform about the development of targeted
risk management measures in the EU by implementing
preventive measures in those pathways and countries that
obtained higher risk scores. Additionally, the modular
framework provided in the additional file can be used
as a template to estimate the risk of ASFV introduction
into other geographic areas or timeframes as more data
become available.
Conclusions
A modular framework has been implemented to estimate
the risk of ASFV entry into the EU through five different
introduction routes: the legal imports of pigs and products
during the high risk period, the illegal imports of products,
the transport associated fomites and the movement of wild
boar. The framework, available in a public domain, inte-
grates the five risk assessment modules and offers a trans-
parent, easy-to-interpret tool that can be easily updated as
data become available and can also be adapted to other re-
gions of interest. The model’s results identify the EU coun-
tries at higher risk per route of ASFV introduction, and
acts as a useful basis to develop a coordinated EU program
and to, ultimately, improve ASFV prevention in the EU.
Endnote
aCroatia was the EU country not included in the analysis
given its recent inclusion in the EU (1/7/2013).
Additional file
Additional file 1: Modular framework for estimating the risk of ASF
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